Sunday, 2 December 2007

Understanding Regional Economic Cooperation in Africa: Sometimes More Is Not Better

Who invented the concept of regional trade agreements (RTAs)? Your immediate answers, let me guess: the Europeans (e.g. European Union)? The Americans (e.g. North America Free Trade Area, NAFTA)? The Asians (e.g. Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC)?

You are absolutely wrong if you chose any of the above,. Believe it or not, the African continent has the longest history of regional economic cooperation. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), founded in 1910, is the oldest trade union in the world. Today, Africa is home to more than 30 regional trade arrangements, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[i] On average, each African country belongs to 4 regional trade blocs (IMF). The goal of cooperation is prosperity. Trade arrangements are made to help Africa benefit from economies of scale, stable foreign direct investment (FDI), diversified regional output and enhanced competitiveness. But, in the case of Africa, long history does not translate into effective policies and prosperity.

Instead, the continent is still far from achieving its visionary goals. Within COMESA, a large trade bloc with 19 southern and eastern African countries, intraregional trade accounted for only 7% of the bloc’s trade in 2005. Intraregional trade is only between 6% and 12% of trade from SADC and ECOWAS. This number is small compared to that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where exchange among its 10 members account for 25% of the region’s trade.[ii]

Why have African RTAs failed?

Several organizational flaws contribute to the failure of regional economic cooperation. Firstly, regional trade blocs often have overlapping memberships. Countries in southern Africa can be members of both COMESA and SADC, while those in eastern Africa can be both members of the Eastern African Community (EAC) and COMESA. Although these regional organizations share a vision of free trade, they differ in their stage of development, scope of operations, time tables for liberalization and economic cooperation policies. For example, Kenya and Uganda are COMESA and EAC members. They adopted the EAC common external tariff (CET) structure of 0%, 10% and 25% in 2003. COMESA, however, proposed to adopt a different CET structure (0%, 5%, 15% and 30%) in 2005. The conflicts between the COMESA proposal and the existing system in EAC have stalled further discussion of CETs in COMESA. Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Mauritius also face a similar problem. Their membership in SADC requires them to dismantle all tariff barriers to SADC countries, including South Africa. But COMESA requires them to exclude South Africa from preferential tariffs. Countries stuck between conflicting policies cannot agree with new policy initiatives and often delay decision-making. Policy enforcement is also impossible when conflicts exist. The credibility of regional organizations then erodes as nothing is accomplished. In the end, conflicting membership and the lack of policy harmonization become a major obstacle to regional integration.

Secondly, trade integration is limited, and intraregional trade activities have widened the economic gap among member countries. Regional agreements have opened up new markets for goods from larger and relatively more developed African countries such as Kenya, South Africa and Egypt. With a better developed industrial base, South Africa accounts for 77% of intra-SADC exports in 2002. Although intra-SADC trade has increased in absolute terms, South Africa’s has grown much faster. South Africa’s intra-SADC export trade is more than 8 times bigger than its import trade. Kenya and Egypt are also major beneficiaries of the COMESA Free Trade Area, a strategy ratified by 11 of the 19 member countries in 2000. Both countries account for 33% and 18% of intra-COMESA exports. Their larger export markets help to attract more investment as well and further enhance the country’s economic prospect.

On the other hand, it is much harder for small or landlocked countries to benefit from regional arrangements. Geographical factors limit the availability of natural resources and hence exclude them from commodities trade, leaving the state and the people too poor to develop agricultural and manufacturing capacity in their country. Therefore, although IMF data show that intra-regional trade is dominated by industrial and food products, the lack of industrial capacity rendered these countries less competitive than their richer and bigger neighbors. As a result, few small countries (perhaps with the exception of Swaziland) have reaped impressive benefits from interregional trade. It will be difficult to convince less developed members to further cooperative efforts unless African trade blocs can prove themselves beneficial to members of vastly different backgrounds.

Thirdly, the enforcement of free trade provisions is slow and inconsistent. Progress to reduce non-tariff barriers is particularly sluggish. The UN Commission for Africa estimates that exports and imports from African countries on average take 6 to 10 days to clear customs. This time frame is twice as long compared to that in Asia. Trade goods also suffer from multiple interstate roadblocks. The IMF claims that in West Africa, there can be 7 roadblocks per 100 kilometers. Other forms of internal barriers include the lack of transport and communications infrastructures on the continent. As long as trade barriers are few, internet and phone line services can help to increase market connectivity and hence improve export performance from even the smaller countries. Better quality of domestic transportation infrastructure can also boost market access.

Next Steps

Given the institutional flaws elaborated above, both intra- and inter-bloc efforts will be pertinent to create more credible institutions and better enforcement mechanisms. Such intra-bloc efforts will certainly include the further promotion of regional production networking, which will connect and strengthen the collective competitiveness of the regional organization. As for inter-bloc efforts, further negotiations will be crucial to achieve multilateral liberalization and to harmonize existing RTAs. In this respect, African leaders are still in dispute. For instance, the SADC plans to become an economic union by 2016 and COMESA hopes to become a customs union in 2008. There are other proposals to transform the African Economic Community (AEC), which will covers all African Union members, into an economic union by 2028. To add to this complex situation, the World Trade Organization forbids dual membership in customs unions. With these impending plans for economic convergence, African countries will also need to choose where they want to belong. The debate is still going on today.

Further reading:

Clarke, George R. Beyond Tariffs and Quotas: Why Don'T African Manufacturers Export More?. World Bank Group. 2004. 2 Dec. 2007 <http://www1.worldbank.org/rped/documents/wps0505.pdf>

Gibb, Richard. "Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa." Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 98 (2007): 421-435.

Khandelwal, Padamja. COMESA and SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade Integration. International Monetary Fund. 2004. 2 Dec. 2007 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04227.pdf>.

"Regional Trade Agreements Gateway." World Trade Organization. 2 Dec. 2007 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm>.

"SADC-COMESA: Which Bloc?" Africa Research Bulletin (2007): 17509-17510.

State of Integration in COMESA. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. 2007. 26 Sept. 2007 <http://www.comesa.int/publications/Multi-language_content.2007-06-08.5926/en>.

Yang, Yongzheng, and Sanjeev Gupta. Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa: Past Performance and the Way Forward. International Monetary Fund. 2005. 2 Dec. 2007 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0536.pdf>.



[i] The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) consists of 19 African states: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) consists of 14 states: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) consists of 16 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

[ii] See http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm for 2005 statistics. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of 10 Southeast Asian countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and VietNam.

Tuesday, 20 November 2007

Broad-Based Engagement Key to Narrow Technology Gap

By Phoebe Leung

** I wrote this entry on Intellectual Property Rights because I researched on the subject, especially related to China, during the summer of 2007. I realized that the debate surrounding the protection of IPR is very skewed towards developed countries because they have a "first-mover" advantage. There are many misunderstandings towards why developing countries resort to piracy.

If you have ever seen the movie “About A Boy,” you must remember Will, a character played by Hugh Grant. He is a rich, yet do-nothing, London bachelor who invented a son to hit on single moms. It is a story of Will learning to accept responsibilities for people that he cares about, and eventually become able to hold a committed relationship. Will’s story, however, goes way back before that. His personal background alone arouses curiosity: how can a person live in London, one of the most expensive cities in the world, without having a wage-earning job? It turns out that his wealth comes from the royalties he collects from his father’s one-hit wonder, Santa’s Super Sleigh. That is, Will lives off the copyright payments collected from radio stations, superstores, and all other users of the song.

Will’s story is only one of the many anecdotes that disgruntled users of intellectual property rights (IPR) can tell. And precisely because of the imbalance between right holders and right users, royalties and the collection of royalties have become very contentious issues in recent years.

Perhaps one of the hottest topics related to IPR is the royalties of DVD players. To add to the heat of this debate, around 60% to 80% of today’s DVD players (approximately 100 million of them around the world) are produced in China, a country frequently bashed at for its IPR violations. However, beneath the physical flow of goods across the Pacific, large sums of money flows back to the patent holders in the U.S., Europe, Japan and Korea. Today, the industry claims that $14 to $27 is collected as patent fees for each DVD player. These charges have led to outcries from DVD player manufacturers, who are obliged to pay the royalties. You may think that these charges only amount to 30% of the player’s final selling price; the rest, 70%, still goes to the pockets of the manufacturers. The picture shows us that the realities of intellectual property right holders and users are far more complicated. (A list of required royalties for a DVD player: http://www.4shared.com/file/30200368/c87ab570/07202007_List_of_Royalties.html).

First and foremost, patent holders are more organized and powerful than patent users. Manufacturing DVD players involve the use of numerous patents for reading discs, compressing digital data, converting images for screenplay, etc., owned by different technology development corporations. Approaching separate patent owners for licenses could be costly and time-consuming. Hence, in the 1990s, the U.S. Judiciary approved the formation of patent pools so as to provide one-stop joint licensing at predetermined royalty rates, given that these licenses contain only “essential patents” for the production. By bestowing a certain degree of monopoly power to patent owners, patent pools should provide convenience for manufacturers in return. But it has become questionable whether they are using their using their monopoly power in a responsible manner. The three dominant patent pools for DVD-related technologies today are the DVD6C Licensing Agency, the 3C DVD Patent Pool and the MPEG LA. In the past few years, they have all been summoned to court for lawsuits for including of non-essential patents in their licenses, charging unreasonable prices for their licenses or engaging other forms of anti-competitive behaviors. Some others wonder why DVD player manufacturers will have to pay for over 400 patents even though they only pick a minority of them for their specific functions. Therefore, manufacturers of DVD player face a monopoly market where they have few choices but to subject to high prices.

To add to the high prices, manufacturers in developing countries find that most core technologies are owned by technology developers in developed countries. DVD’s technical standards and specifications are also determined by developed countries that started to research and develop the technology well before DVDs were introduced in 1994. For instance, while China exports large amounts of DVD players, Chinese scholars have argued that over 50% of related core technologies belong to multinational corporations (MNCs). Only 0.03% of China’s enterprises own patents to core technologies. In this way, Chinese manufacturers are reliant on foreign technologies and have to send huge sums abroad every year in order to produce exportable DVD players. Also, the monopoly of core technologies is bad news to technology developers in developing countries. It is almost impossible for developing countries to develop relevant technologies without first using existing DVD formats, mp3 or Dolby audio soundtracks, and video codec systems.

Third, developed countries, where most right holders are, tend to have a longer history of IPR development, IPR management (both from a corporate or national level) and IPR enforcement. In such countries, high wages and land rent have pushed out manufacturing plants. Instead, their economy is very much technology-based, meaning that their earnings come from asserting their intellectual property rights. On the other hand, in developing countries, the concept of IPR is quite foreign. Take China as an example again. Prior to market reforms in the 1980s, the closest legislation to modern day IPR laws was the “patent certificate” that required inventors to “donate their ideas to the state in exchange for a reward.” Copyright laws were non-existent due to ideological control. However, under new a trade agreement with the U.S. in 1979, China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980 and established its Trademark Law (1982), Patent Law (1984) and Copyright Law (1990) within 10 years. It also joined important IPR treaties such as the Berne Convention (1992), the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1996), and more recently, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in 2007. Today, contrary to common misperceptions, China’s IPR laws are more or less compliant with international standards. But public polls have indicated that the IPR legal regime is evolving much faster than the public’s mentality and business practices. As a result, foreign companies are more likely to take legal actions against any IPR violations while Chinese companies may just use traditional, under-the-table means to settle IPR problems. The same is true for other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, who started to adapt to the international IPR regime only in the 1990s. In China, at least, local companies are becoming more aware of their intellectual property rights. In some cases, they even sued MNCs for trademark or patent infringement. However, in possession of most core technologies and ample financial resources and legal expertise, right holders from developed countries still hold an upper hand in the enforcement of IPR laws.

Fourth, right users, such as manufacturers, are often not the biggest beneficiaries of trade. The final selling price of DVD players, which is lowered from around two to three hundred in 1999 to less than $100 today, is far higher than the amount manufacturers get. This is because DVD player manufacturers are often Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) themselves. That is, they are under contracts to produce brand name products according to standards provided. In turn, the brand name company will purchase products from the OEM and resells the products as its own. The contract manufacturing price could be less low as $30 to $40. Therefore, patent payments as high as $27 can significantly undermine the OEM’s marginal revenue. Instead, the middlemen often reap the biggest piece of the pie by pulling up the price of DVD players.

In sum, as developed economies adjust to a technology- and knowledge-based economy, intellectual property rights have become a money-spinner for developed countries and multinational corporations. In developing countries, intellectual property rights have also emerged as a necessity for economic development and technological innovation. The contention, therefore, lies at whether the current IPR legal regime provides a fair ground for competition, or whether it favors first-comers only. There could be some room to review the prices of current IPR fees, but a more practical means to alleviate the debate involves helping to stimulate technological development in developing countries. These means could include: (i) enhance academic and technological exchanges between intellectual and scientific community by way of, for example, scholars program or research fellowships; (ii) encourage right-holding enterprises to enhance exchanges with their counterparts in the developing world, especially on strategic IPR management and brand name protection; (iii) exchange legal knowledge and ensure fair representation of developing countries in IPR disputes. In order to alleviate some of the contentions in the current international IPR regime, broad-based engagement will be necessary. Indeed, governments, businesses, legal experts and scientists from both developed and developing countries will all need to participate in this effort.


Further reading:

“Redefining Intellectual Property Value: The Case of China,” Price Waterhouse Coopers, October 2005, https://www.pwc.com/techforecast/pdfs/IPR-web_x.pdf

“A Chinese-Made DVD Player Contains Almost 400 Western, Japanese, and Korean Patents,” Progressive Policy Institute Trade Fact of the Week, 20 June 2007, http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=108&subsecID=900003&contentID=254366

United States Trade Representative Special 301 Report, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file230_11122.pdf

Chinese authorities claim that high patent fees are dragging down the country’s DVD player exports: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/03/eng20040803_151685.html