A recent study published by the ILO, UNICEF and World Bank estimated 310,000 children in the worst forms of child labour (WFCL) in Cambodia based on the 2004 Census. The National Plan of Action for Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labour specifies 16 WFCL, including deep water fishing, salt-making, rubber-planting, child-portering, brick-making, scavenging, domestic work and sex work, etc. To reach the global target of eliminating these WFCL by 2016, the ILO has especially raised attention to how “social safety net” measures may empower vulnerable families as well as contribute to withdrawing child labourers and preventing any fresh entry of children into the workforce.
Specifically, in the context of Cambodia, conditional cash transfers (CCT) appears to have the greatest potential to reduce child labour. A nationwide CCT Scheme will likely be a social assistance programme giving cash benefits to very poor households in exchange of pre-specified investments in their children’s education and health. CCT schemes have been implemented in various parts of the world, especially in Latin America. However, although the concept of CCT has been widely accepted, the implementation challenges faced by each country may differ significantly. In Cambodia, in particular, the incidence of child labour is much higher than in Latin American countries. Therefore, mechanisms for beneficiary targeting, conditionality setting, monitoring and evaluation and fraud safeguard must be adapted according to the local context.
A key first step to operationalizing a CCT Scheme is the identification of beneficiaries. A targeting system may focus on all households of districts with the lowest school enrolment rates and the highest incidence of child labour. The Scheme may also target all households below certain income or asset levels. As well, CCT can also target vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women, infants, disabled persons, elderly and street children, etc. Any decisions regarding this targeting mechanism must be supported by a clear rationale and realistic predictions about the programme’s cost. More importantly, this system must comprise well-tested surveying and analytical tools for capturing poorest of the poor households.
Conditionality is key to the design of any CCT Scheme. A CCT scheme may directly contribute to promoting education and reducing child labour by specifying that children from beneficiary households must be enrolled in school and achieve satisfactory attendance.
However, this list of conditions may also be adapted to address weaknesses in the Cambodian education system and the high incidence of child labour. In the past few years, for instance, the ILO’s International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) have set up community learning centres and transitional education activities for rehabilitating child labourers. Eligible households should also be rewarded for supporting former child labourers in informal courses in order to facilitate their integration into formal academic and vocational institutions. Furthermore, experiences from practitioners have indicated that after school programmes can effectively increase children’s time spent in schools and directly reduce their likelihood in working. Thus, the Cambodian CCT Scheme may incorporate after school activities and extra classes as conditionality. Noting low transition rate from primary to secondary schools, graduation and promotion bonuses may also be delivered.
More crucially, policy makers must bear in mind that each additional condition entails extra administrative costs. Due to geographical and resource constraints, some localities also lack the infrastructure for eligible families to fulfil these conditions. Therefore, the Royal Government and donors should generate clear justifications for the conditions chosen and the financial resources devoted to monitoring and evaluating compliance. At the same time, external and internal resources to be mobilized for putting in place appropriate infrastructure and facilities.
Any social protection scheme which involves cash benefits is prone to corruption and fraud. Thus, a fraud-proof and easily accessible cash distribution system should accompany the CCT Scheme. Ideally, the programme should utilize only one channel, such as the local/district/commune Department of Social Affairs, to distribute funds throughout the country. However, given geographical differences, some government officials may be incapable of managing meticulous accounts. In Cambodia, more decentralized methods of delivering cash benefits may be more practical and the district/commune may take leadership to explore viable means to channel these funds. In effect, there will likely be several parallel forms of delivery mechanisms within the country.
Nonetheless, the exact means for delivering cash benefits in various communities are still to be discussed. Some possibilities include distribution through well-established local businesses and convenience stores located near a local market. Transactions and payments may take place over the counter as beneficiary families present government-issued identification cards. Alternatively, experiences in Africa have shown that mobile banking is a growing possibility in developing countries. Rural households with mobile phones may check their balances via text messages or phone calls. Those without phones may approach local service providers to monitor their account activities at a low cost. Distribution by trusted local village chiefs, commune council representatives and school/health care directors are likely choices as well. In sum, the system chosen at various localities must be reliable and be able to deliver benefits in a timely fashion.
Going hand in hand with the transparent cash delivery system, the CCT Scheme should include an independent fraud safeguard, appeals and dispute resolution mechanism. A hotline, for instance, may be set up to receive feedback on the shortcomings of the targeting system (such as missing out some needy persons) and to prevent abuse of the CCT Scheme. A follow-up mechanism, manned by trusted officials and trained arbiters, may then step in to investigate valid complaints. These measures would help to ensure the transparency and integrity of the CCT Scheme. Noting reports on corruption and bureaucratic red-tape, these safeguards will be especially crucial for delivering benefits to the needy.
All in all, although the efficacy of CCT schemes have been proven in many countries, success should be taken as granted or automatic. When considering CCT as the main tool for promoting education and reducing child labour, more discussions and research would be needed to identify remedies for these abovementioned implementation challenges.
Reference:
Hamid Tabatabai, “Eliminating Child Labour: The Promise of Conditional Cash Transfers,” International Labour Organization (ILO/IPEC), October 2006.
“Towards Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Cambodia by 2016: An Assessment of Resource Requirements,” Understanding Children’s Work, May 2009.
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